By Thomas Ashe and Shahriar Chowdhury
Since its inception in 1975, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is an important component for supporting peace and stability in the region. Its mandates include safeguarding and promoting human rights, arms control, including disarmament and confidence- and security-building, and countering terrorism, among many others. This vast portfolio, combined with the ever-increasing need for security, certainly keeps the OSCE busy. However, the decision-making process within the body serves as its barrier to achieve success. One of the defining features of the OSCE is its ability to promote a transparent atmosphere among its members by including each member in their decision-making process. While the convoluted system tries its best to provide an inclusive system for its members, there is evidence demonstrating the need for systemic reform. It is our recommendation that institutions within the OSCE be merged into a new body, named The Permanent Council for Security and Cooperation or (PCSC), and voting be changed to majority in the Parliamentary Assembly and some member states within the PSCS be granted veto power authority.
The current decision-making body is comprised of eight bodies, each serving a specific function. Though these bodies are not directly making policy decisions, they serve in another capacity, as a forum for state representatives to gather and speak on their security interests in the hopes of contributing to collective security while pursuing their own state interest. Already we see a problem with this system, the widespread of interests among its member states diverges from the organizations interests forcing the organization to channel into its subsidiary channels to find some form of consensus. To reach a consensus, the proposal must some way align with member state interests. The current process stagnates at this point because of research and analysis by each decision body. As Valerie Pacer notes in her book, the consensus principle has often led to ambiguous decisions with nonspecific wording. Once a draft resolution is agreed upon, the substantive decisions are made by committees to look over the draft before being passed on to preparatory committees. Proposed resolutions offered to ambassadors are reviewed by each respective party and then when the states re-adjourn for their subsequent meeting, they discuss the recommendation openly among each other. The archaic system is no longer efficient as its process is too rigid to adapt to emerging security trends. At this point, it would be better off to consult with specialized international organizations to address state concerns. Additionally, it would serve OSCE well if it focused on the issues that it can make tangible progress on, and leave other issues, such as those that pertain to the environment, for example, to the United Nations Environment Programme. Reform at the OSCE can be observed as the streamlining of institutions to produce efficiencies, which includes its decision-making process.
Since the OSCE operates under a decision by consensus system we suggest the improvements to be made to the current system is by merging the internal bodies into one new body. As outlined by the OSCE, The Ministerial Council serves as the central-decision making body, the Permanent Council governs day-today operational work, and the Forum for Security Co-operation helps implement security-building measures, and the Parliamentary Assembly serves as the legislative body, facilitating inter-parliamentary dialogue. Rather than having countless internal bodies wielding decision making powers, it would be prudent for the OSCE to eradicate duplications and build a centralized system. The Forum for Security Co-operation would still serve as an important body for security dialogue, while increasing its portfolio to not only security bases issues. We offer a solution: merging the Ministerial Council and Permanent Council into a new body, called The Permanent Council for Security and Cooperation or (PCSC). We believe this strategy can increase effectiveness. Membership within the PSCS will include:
- United States,
- France,
- United Kingdom,
- Germany,
- Sweden,
- Turkey, and
- Russia.
On a rotating basis, from one of each region, a country will be elected as a non-elected member to serve a two-year term. The P-7 members will be granted veto authority. This will ensure that P-7 members will remain at the negotiation table. To achieve this, a member state will introduce a resolution in the Parliamentary Assembly, since this body is tasked with the development of OSCE institutional structures.
The current decision making process limits the organizations ability to act quickly, which undermines organizational efficiency. Reforming the organizational structure essentially cuts to the core of problem. With the OSCE budget of just over 150 million USD, every dollar counts and needs to be spent economically. While consensus voting be a way to ensure agreement with all parties, it can lead to deadlock, which it did in Georgia. Thus, merging institutions and shifting voting procedure to consensus, with veto authority attached to specific member states, will make the organization more effective.
Reforming International Organizations 