‘Game Changer’ for the International Criminal Court

By Chiazam Onyenso, John Velazquez, and Henrietta MacPepple

The initial birth of the International Criminal Court engendered faith in the potential capacity of a formidable international criminal justice system. Its central objectives to enact justice for crimes against humanity, victims of genocide, and also combat impunity for perpetrators have remained unaltered. Yet, also at its creation, doubt in the ICC surfaced from uncertainty in its autonomy and where the legitimacy of the court actually lies.  Legitimacy is referenced in the ICC’s ability to exact legal fairness as an international institution and apply its jurisdiction without violating national sovereignty. While there exists a number of reasons that are likewise obstacles to the court’s effectiveness, the authority and legitimacy of the ICC lies in question to select states within the international sphere.

The failure of the court to broaden the scope of its investigations, trials and prosecutions away from its majority of African cases, enforce its verdicts and hold states accountable has caused the legitimacy of the ICC to waver. In order to eschew claims that the ICC acts against core precepts of national sovereignty, and procure more concrete support for the conduct of its trials, the court is in need of a strategy that will accredit the capacity of nations to internalize prosecutions and trials. This strategy we propose of proactive complementarity posits that it is the responsibility of the ICC to enhance the ability of states to adopt trial practices that reflect those of the court without its own direct controversial interference. Proactive complementarity requires the internalization of various concepts of morality that determine justice be established by domestic courts so as to minimize claims that the ICC undercuts the legitimacy of national jurisdictions and sovereignty. The strategy also diminishes cause for national reluctance to abide to the authority of the ICC and also reinforces the capacity of the nations to adequately address crimes against humanity on their own with additional support from the international justice court system.

The overall benefit of proactive complementarity is the strengthening of national institutional capacity to proceed with trials dealing with crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. This is highly desirable since the essence of the ICC is that it is a court of last resort; it was never meant to handle an enormous caseload, rather, it is supposed to proceed when and if a state is unable or unwilling to try the case themselves, for whatever reason. One requirement for this strengthening is the penetration of international norms in the domestic legal framework. Achieving this would be a positive boost to the ICC’s legitimacy, as it is the very embodiment of such norms.  On another note, although not every ICC case is an African one, historically the majority of cases indeed have been, thus creating the sentiment that the ICC institution itself is but a new form of Western European control/neo-colonialism. With national courts (in this case African) able to try cases on their own with ICC guidance, this negative notion of the ICC would be dispelled, more individuals would be put on trial, and the positive development itself would likely attract other African states to become signatories to the Rome Statute itself.

The cost of achieving positive complementarity would be best measured in the amount of time and resources lost. Internalizing international legal norms in states where high skepticism and distrust exist can take long periods of time. Building up local judicial capacity and training professionals likewise takes more time and money which some states may be hard pressed to find. Additionally, while achieving positive complementarity in regions (predominantly African) with poorly equipped judicial systems is a significant improvement and necessity, the ICC’s legitimacy still suffers from a lack of U.S. ratification. Nevertheless, this strategy is an important step that will give a strong boost to its perceived legitimacy and consequently its effectiveness.

Proactive complementarity with a focus on rebuilding and developing judicial institutions and resources is vital in order to help strengthen the ICC’s legitimacy. By encouraging mutual exchange of ideas with domestic courts, the ICC can build domestic capacity by working collaboratively with national courts to establish institutes and centers that strengthen the domestic judiciary. Multi-disciplined experts should be consulted to understand the local terrain, advocacy and outreach groups should be well-informed of the improvements being made to the judicial system and institutions should hold local judiciary accountable to ensure fair trials and judgments are made.

The ICC should work with national and regional governance bodies to increase local judicial resources. In cases of states that are not able to prosecute their own cases domestically, the ICC could share legal resources, analysis and intelligence with domestic governments or judiciaries. In the event that courts are unable to prosecute because it lacks legal resources and tools, the ICC may provide access to publicly available information.

In order to adequately maintain sovereignty, the ICC must stress its status as a court of last resort whose role is not to supplant the authority of the domestic judiciary but to be supportive and complementary in the prosecution of serious cases. The ICC should rely on the principles set in the Rome Statute to convince states to prosecute crimes domestically. This communication would be based on the obligations that domestic courts have to prosecute international crimes. Before interceding, the ICC should attempt to motivate domestic courts to undertake its own prosecution and investigation and then only if these efforts are unsuccessful, pursue its own prosecution and investigation.

The World Bank getting heat for its governance on Climate Change

By Trinushka Perera and Amy Marks

The World Bank, a part of the World Bank Group, focuses primarily on reducing worldwide poverty through financial and technical assistance. Among a variety of initiatives, the World Bank is a significant contributing financial institution to the Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP), which was established as an effort to accelerate developing countries’ strategies towards minimizing climate change together with the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The plan provides an imperative tool used to monitor the effectiveness of its execution in developing countries and provides a glimpse into the forecasting of future expectations. However, the effectiveness of executing the CCAP in developing countries is challenged by the governance structure of the World Bank.

The Bank’s undemocratic structure, which is predominantly governed by industrialist countries, raises challenges due to the lack of input in the design and planning process by the developing countries, whom of which are the most vulnerable beneficiaries of the policy’s plan. Presently, as seen in evidence presented by Birdsall, regional banks collectively have a far greater voting share for developing countries, which are borrowers (at least 50%), in contrast to the World Bank’s borrowing countries, who have a minority voting share (38%). Furthermore, the basic membership vote allocated per country has not changed since 1979, which in itself insinuates the outdated governance structure.

The lack of influence and representation within the World Bank exposes developing countries into a quagmire that is at the mercy of developed nation’s policies and proposals. As Barnett and Finnemore put it, “why would states set up organizations and continue to support them if they didn’t serve the state’s interests?” This sound logic highlights the shortcomings of the World Bank’s governance in its ability to implement and execute policies that are in the best interest of the World as a whole. Therefore, it is in the World Bank’s best interest to restructure the governance by increasing the developing country’s frequency of basic membership votes in order to effectively carry out CCAP.

It is our view that, by increasing the basic membership of developing country’s votes, the World Bank will successfully minimize the conflict of interest at the initial stages, when developing and implementing policies. The increase of chairs on the executive board suggest more constituencies with representatives that would subsequently diversify the knowledge and experiences of perspectives when addressing the field of climate change. Cinani, a contributor to the Huffington Post, identifies that the lack of a solid foundation in the governance structure coupled with the World Bank policy formation, is a recipe for a conflict of interest when executing the CCAP. Additionally, increasing the basic membership vote, increases transparency and accountability of the World Bank as a whole, which is imperative when considering the bank’s mission as a whole.

An ideal plan to follow and implement the increase of both basic membership votes and increasing the number of chairs on the Bank’s board for utmost results, is to adopt and shadow voting structures of other regional banks, such as the path of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). A simple way the World Bank could move forward in improving this aspect is to have a “one for all” increase of the basic membership vote. Ideally this can be done with increasing the number of constituencies that are represented through various region pools. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the constituencies can be increased from the present two to three and the same can be replicated in other necessary regions, where the voice of the vote is insignificant and one constituencies that represents a large number of countries, can be broken down further.  

Phase two of the implementation is to source board of executive directors to maintain a greater insight into policy planning and designing. Steve Denning writes an article to the Forbes highlighting that certain policies the western world suggest through the World Bank are policies that could not be implemented for themselves, yet alone for developing countries. This directly highlights that it would be ideal to carry out intervention sessions, to foster and understand  the comprehensive sides that are directly affected by the crisis, thus making the “one for all” increase implementation more valuable.

Regardless of the shortcomings of the World Bank, it will continue to remain as one of the largest and most influential banks of all time. As the earth’s surface temperature continues to rise, the action plan drawn by the GCF coupled with the World Bank should be commended. As large funds are being continuously spent towards eliminating climate change, it is important that the governance structure increases developing countries’ membership votes. Moving forward will enable the CCAP to be effectively be implemented without the constraints of an ineffective governing structure.

Finding Opportunity in the Chaos: Using UN Reform Momentum to Revitalize Forgotten Organs

By Julia Munsaka and Angelo Piro

The United Nations (UN) is on the height of massive change. It is beginning to take on the post-2015 development agenda, which stands to shift and shape its mission. Even in electing its next leader, the UN focused on candidate’s ability to change and evolve the over 70-year-old organization. While this period of upheaval and change can be source of worry for many observers, it can also be a time to reinvigorate misused or outdated organizations. With the door open to significant change, declining arms of the UN such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) stand to gain the most. As leaders and policy makers begin the process of retooling a smarter, sleeker UN, they must look to engage all tools at their disposal, including UNCTAD.

Meant to be the center of international dialogue on trade, economics and development, with a focus on the needs of the developing world, UNCTAD has suffered a period of abuse and neglect that has left it with the same relevancy as the Trusteeship Committee. Additionally, UNCTAD has stalled under the weight of consensus voting, which essentially killed any potential for significant policy in light of such divergent interests. This stunted discourse, paired with a much reduced budgetary and operational capacity, has led UNCTAD to regress from a centerpiece of the UN system to one whose voice struggles to be heard. Its meetings are primarily attended by interns if at all and its role has been assumed by newer, more efficient organizations like the WTO, IMF and World Bank. While the evolution and end of organizations (or branches) is normal and healthy, the deliberate disempowerment of UNCTAD has had real world consequences. For years, researchers and experts of UNCTAD warned of the structural problems that would eventually lead to the 2008 global financial crisis. These warnings were ignored, much to the detriment of people and economies around the world. Without the means to make its voice matter again the world economy, UNCTAD may find itself facing regrettable hindsight once again.

How then can the world avoid facing a similar situation? How can policymakers revitalize the work of UNCTAD and make it a relevant organ for the post-2015, post-reform world? The political situation surrounding UNCTAD’s use of consensus voting is unlikely to be easily resolved, so, rather than address the political shortcomings of UNCTAD, policymakers would be better served transforming UNCTAD from a normative, principle setting organization into a practical and technical focused one that functions as a forum not to set trade law and practices but rather creates cohesive financial, developmental and technical structures and agreements that serve the needs of developing economies. In the coming reform talks, leaders must consider pursuing such a goal, which can be accomplished with the existing structure of UNCTAD, needing only to empower the Trade and Development Board with the resources to rise to the occasion. To fully realize UNCTAD’s potential, it needs the funding to fully engage in its mission and fulfill the needs of its member states. This can be through an increase in the regular budget for standard core practices of UNCTAD focusing on the three core commissions of the Board, allowing them to fully staff and produce the high quality research that they are known for. Preparatory reports and recommendations will serve to set the agenda and help depoliticize ensuing meetings of UNCTAD. A voluntary trust can also be established to bring to fruition long dead plans to institute ad hoc commissions within UNCTAD, allowing them to tackle emerging issues that might need special attention or which don’t fit perfectly within functional commission.

Together, these two influxes of resources can serve to spark UNCTAD’s research and advisory role. This will allow it to regain its relevancy as the need for assistance in constructing effective financial, taxation, and investment structures to fulfill the post-2015 development goals, and, more importantly, the plans set out in the Addis Ababa Agreement on Financing for Development, becomes more apparent. Such a plan can even serve the cost-saving and efficiency goals put forward by Mr. Trump and Guterres. With the means to support its mission, UNCTAD can become the permanent forum for many of the issues now covered by inefficient, ad hoc, insulated forums. Issues like North-South and South-South cooperation, knowledge transfers, aid for trade, financial reform, and others can all be brought together and coordinated under the UNCTAD umbrella.

While many may see a coming storm from the rhetoric surrounding reforms at the UN, policy makers should instead focus on the opportunity to reinvent and evolve. The UN has many tools at its disposal, and organizations like UNCTAD need only be set on the right path to be the best tool for the job.

UNEP: Overcoming a Major Barrier

By Lis Kabashi and Caroline Pinsky

Since its creation in 1972, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has become a very important tool to promote cooperation between world governments in regards to the environment. It’s functions include (1) monitoring, assessment, and early warning, (2) developing international norms, standards, and policies, (3) catalyzing environmental action, (4) coordinating the environmental activities of the UN system, and (5) building national institutional capacity. Because other functions have performed relatively well, the primary functions of UNEP we examine in our study include harmonizing the environmental undertakings of the UN system, catalyzing environmental action and developing international norms. Concerning these three functions, we believe that location has been the primary reason behind the programme’s ineffectiveness. Because of the headquarters’ location in Nairobi, UNEP’s ability to recruit professional staff and interact with other agencies or government officials has been limited. Therefore, to overcome these issues and increase the organization’s effectiveness, we argue that it is necessary to re-locate certain functions of UNEP to New York.

In our research, we have found that the UNEP faces barriers that greatly challenge overall effectiveness of the programme. In order to deal with this barrier, the UNEP can alter itself to become a more effective organ in the United Nations. In order to do so, UNEP needs to delegate crucial tasks to New York rather than them being currently located in Nairobi. The association would greatly benefit from this reorganization. UNEP should build upon key and pre-existing functions. The three functions are developing international norms, increase coordination amongst the environmental activities and catalyzing environmental action. Re-structuring these functions into the New York office will create a stronger UNEP. Many scholars agree with this thought.  One particular scholar, Joy Hyvarinen, argues that the United Nations needs to tackle environmental issues in a more efficient way. Specifically stating that “the international organizations that look after the global environment need reform.” While the UNEP’s location in Nairobi is not an extremely negative aspect about the organization, it does create a few issues especially in terms of effectiveness. UNEP’s location in Nairobi, creates a geographic conflict for the organization. More specifically UNEP, is unable to progress in areas like communication, employment and environmental operations. In terms of communication, UNEP’s headquarters make it difficult for UNEP and other UN organizations as well as civil society to transfer information efficiently and effectively.  Secondly, the Headquarter has often experienced conflicts with recruitment as well as having employees work at that location for long-term assignments. Many qualified UN employees seek to work in cities like New York because of its career opportunities, safety, and thriving atmosphere . Lastly, environmental operations lack funding and support, therefore by moving certain functions to NYHQ, UNEP will be able to have better cooperation and coordination with fellow environmental organizations and environmental groups that are dedicated to raising awareness about their environmental issues. These issues have an impeding effect on the organization but ultimately can cause a negative effect on environmental governance.

Because UNEP is the leading environmental authority, and because most of the UN Sustainable Development Goals deal with environmental sustainability, we think that the implementation of our strategy should be in line with the implementation of SDGs. With this in mind, we think that the relocation could be done in the next four years. This means that there is enough time for the programme to train and hire professional employees. It also means that after its relocation, UNEP has 10 years to fulfill its functions as well as contribute to the implementation of SDGs. Yet, UNEP would have to pay for the incidentals to re-locate some functions to New York. Not only does this mean that separately from paying the existing personnel, UNEP would have to pay new employees. In addition, implementing this strategy would also require the approval from developing countries. It is very important for developing countries to understand that UNEP will remain a major UN entity in a developing country.

To conclude, UNEP is the world’s most important international environmental agency, and should as a result develop into a larger organization within the United Nations. UNEP is extremely qualified to improve people’s quality of life without compromising that of future organizations.  Thus, to achieve its full potential, UNEP must relocate some of its functions that are vital to the organization. We suggest that the UNEP transitions some of its major functions from Nairobi to New York. Despite the drawbacks to our strategy, it is the most feasible given the limited financial resources of the programme.

 

 

 

 

UNDP too Big to Succeed?

 

By Ruthly Cadestin and Dennis Meaney

Established in 1965, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) may have the widest scope of responsibilities of all international organizations (IO) housed within the UN system. The organization takes part in micro-financing, green energy development, programs for gender equity, and provides assistance to establishing political parties among many other functions. The UNDP therefore, has quite the ambitious set of goals. When we began our pursuit of looking at how this particular IO could be reformed to achieve greater effectiveness, we kept coming back to the Programme’s expansive mandate. If one IO is tasked with such a Herculean task but doesn’t have the capacity to fulfill it, it may be more an error of design than a failure of the organization itself.

We came to identify the barrier to the organization’s effectiveness as its large mandate and its inability, both in terms of institutional capacity and resources to fulfill its mandate. We then broke down the UNDP’s mandate into two rough functional categories. First, the UNDP does data collection and synthesis to provide policy frameworks to foster development in member states. The second, the UNDP does the on ground work mentioned previously, creating green energy programs, fostering the rule of law, creating gender equity, etc.

Upon examining the literature on the topic, we found the UNDP excelled in its role as data collector and data synthesizing institution. The UNDP annually releases a report on development across the globe called the Human Development Index (HDI) that was created in the 1990s. The report was created by a group of Economists hired by the organization to create a good metric to measure development. This metric included things beyond just economic growth such as health outcomes and availability of education. The success of this design of human development is visible from its widespread use by academics and policymakers the world over.

It was the on-the-ground work that we found the UNDP often fell short of its mandate. For instance, the UNDP was charged with helping to develop the Afghan National Police to strengthen the rule of law in the recovering country. An audit by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan showed that there was very little oversight of that program. The UNDP did not keep good records of the police force rosters leading to payments to fraudulent actors. Certainly Afghanistan is a difficult place to operate, with its enduring insurgencies and endemic corruption, but we must ask if the UNDP is well equipped to operate in these places at all. This is a common trend when observing similar cases in Somalia.

Therefore, in order to target and increase UNDP’s effectiveness, we concluded with two approaches. One way in which we might address the problems facing the UNDP would be to increase its capacity to fulfill its mandate. Given the current demands of the global community, UNDP is faced completing tasks from micro-finance to writing constitutions for transitioning democracies. Clearly, in order to tackle such a large task the proper resources must be available to meet the demand. However, we believe it is unfeasible that the UNDP could acquire the amount of resources needed to operate such a broad mandate. Likewise, sovereignty presents a problem which will the limit the autonomy of UNDP operations within any sovereign state.

Another alternative strategy is to stray from completing tasks in the field and focus on the building and distributing informative, vital information to aid in society’s productivity. The UNDP should focus on what it does best.  It should allow NGOs and civil society groups to complete on-the-ground tasks, assist in alleviating the scarcity of resources and help in the distribution process used to gain donors and contracting.

Hellen Clark, current administrator of the UNDP and Chair of the United Nations Development Group, is a true champion of this strategy given her recent efforts to downsize UNDP’s internal workforce and concentrating on UNDP’s skeleton. It allows UNDP to be more effective and transparent in its efforts by limiting its bureaucratic structure through downsizing. By continuing their agenda to maintain a 40 percent regional staff distribution to 60 percent at its headquarters in order to increase and implement its objective through public-private partnerships, NGOs, and local governments, the UNDP is guaranteed to ensure an effective international organization.

We understand the disadvantages of relying on partners to complete the UNDP’s tasks. The principal-agent problem presents us with a dilemma, in which groups the UNDP is required to work with may not share its precise aims. Despite the drawbacks to such an approach, it is the most feasible given the current operation budget and capacity. The principal-agent problem however can be ameliorated by providing the proper inducements and oversight to said organizations. If the UNDP continues of the current path started by Ms. Clark, we believe the organizations’ ambitious goal will be within reach.

IMF: Out with the U.S., in with BRICS?

By Morgan McMichen and Isaac Agyemang Duah

The role of international organizations has been under attack since the new U.S. administration took office in January. In the past, Trump has referred to NATO as obsolete, to the UN as just a club for people to get together, talk and have a good time, and is an outspoken critic of multilateralism altogether.   In his inauguration speech, Trump stated, “We must protect our borders from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs… Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength.” The isolationist rhetoric used by Mr. Trump heavily clashes with the globalized, interconnected nature of the IMF. And while Trump has recently done a complete 180 with his stance on other international organizations, the IMF seems to be of no real importance to him as it contradicts his “America First” mantra.

So, what would it mean if the US pulled out of the IMF? Well, the IMF would certainly have to fill that void somehow. The US currently gets nearly 1/5 of the total votes in the organization with a financial commitment of nearly 1/5 of the entire quota. Also, the U.S. dollar dominates in global finance and trade. Being such an important stakeholder comes with its advantages- i.e. setting the agenda for the world economy since WWII. Pulling out of the IMF would have devastating effects for the US in terms of power and influence on global finance. Furthermore, the Fund would suffer greatly and have to scramble to make ends meet.

But who could potentially benefit from such a scenario? The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries. BRICS have seen themselves as marginalized victims underrepresented in the Fund. As a result of the IMF’s 2010 quota and governance reforms, Brazil, Russia, India, and China, for the first time, have entered the International Monetary Fund’s top 10 biggest members. Even with the increased quotas, they still only have a 14.7 percent voting share, which is not sufficient to earn them a veto. So as rising economic and political forces in the world, they argue their voting power is disproportionate to their economic output. Recently, they have created a regional bank, the New Development Bank (NDB), with a supplementary reserve. This bank will finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects in the BRICS countries primarily, but other low and middle-income countries can access funding in the future. Some have argued that the NDB is set to rival the IMF while others claim it merely complements it. Either way, this new bank has many of the same functions as the IMF.  While it is only open to the BRICS right now, it plans to expand in the future. Where BRICS would normally turn to the Fund, they are now turning to the NDB. And in the future, many other countries could be doing the same. This is an obvious barrier to the IMF, but not all is lost as BRICS are still participants and stakeholders in the Fund.

A U.S. departure could be an open invitation for the BRICS countries to step up to the plate. This is because the IMF would be desperate to fill the gap left by the U.S. and the BRICS are seeking an even bigger role within the Fund. The United States, as of April 21, 2017, contributes SDR 82.99billion (about US$116billion), while the BRICS countries collectively contribute 70.59billion (about US$99billion).   The question is whether the BRICS countries could collectively fill such a gap. And if so, how? Would they pull money from the New Development Bank? Would they pull it from other resources within their respective countries? Would China alone aspire to fill the majority of the gap in its global economic rise to power? These are all variables that affect the BRICS representation and power in the IMF, should the U.S. leave.

If this scenario played out and BRICS filled the gap, partially or wholly, this would force additional reform in the IMF. Such a reform would credit the IMF with better geopolitical representation, a longstanding criticism, as well as allow the BRICS countries the representation and influence they strive to hold. The IMF would no longer face the accusation of being a western institution and BRICS would gain more voting rights, a veto right, and contribute more to the Fund.

It may seem far-fetched to consider the IMF or any international organization without the presence and contributions of the U.S., but it is a potential reality nonetheless. One thing is for sure, the world keeps turning whether the U.S. is leading it, or not. And there will always be someone or in this case, a group, ready to step into power. So, out with the U.S. and in with BRICS? Only time and decisions by the Trump administration will tell.

The Abuse of Interpol’s Red Notices by States

By Charlotte Malenga and Josseline Rios Velasquez

The Interpol was created in 1914, with the purpose of providing states’ police with information and advanced technology in order for states to combat international crimes and emerging crimes, as well as promoting mutual assistance among criminal police authorities within the limits of national laws. The Constitution of the Interpol has also set specific terms on its involvement in the international community. For example, according to Article 3 of Interpol’s Constitution, ‘It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.’ This is in order to reaffirm the independence and neutrality of the institution. But it is exactly this article which has caused controversy and has caused for the institution to be considered weak. A barrier that the Interpol has been facing is that it is being politicized.

The Interpol is being politicized by states when they abuse the use of red notices. States are abusing their power and are misusing red notices. A Red Notice is “an international wanted notice put out by Interpol on behalf of a country seeking a fugitive.” States put up names of people they consider fugitives and a threat for their states. While some countries put up the name of true criminals and terrorists, others put up names of citizens that are persecuted for the sole reason that they are against the political ideas of the state’s government. A clear example of this was the case of Venezuelan journalist, Patricia Poleo. Her name was put in the red notice list because she opposed her government’s political ideas. Due to this, she was detained when she planned to travel and it took her more than two years to clear up her name and get taken out of the list.

This is a major problem for the effectiveness of the Interpol. This type of action by certain states, which are usually those states with poor human rights and non-democratic, make of the Interpol an ineffective tool and rather a political one. In order to combat this issue the Interpol should “speed up and streamline the process to challenge red notices” with the help of the Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files (CCF). The Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files “is an independent body officially responsible for monitoring the application of INTERPOL’s data protection rules.” With the help of this commission, the victims that have been already wrongly issued red notices under their names will have a place where to complaint and their case can be heard, in order for them to clear their name and stop being considered fugitives or criminals.

In order for this strategy to work, it is essential for this commission to have autonomy and be able to challenge the requests by the states. It is also essential for the victims to be able to feel that this is a neutral place they can reach to and where they can prove that they are innocent. It is necessary to have hearings between the refugees and the political agents. The CCF should have the power to request information from the states in order to corroborate if their red notice is valid or not. In case the questioned state is unable to provide this information in a set limited time of period, then the commission should be able to dismiss the case, the red notice alert, and in addition, the Interpol/CCF should have the power to sanction the state for not being able to provide enough information and for misusing and taking advantage of an international tool.  In case a state misuses the red notices continually, it should have restricted access to the data available by the Interpol as well.

The problem with red notices does not only reside on when they are first issued, but the problem continues once they are issued. Before a red notice is issued, the Interpol should ask for enough proof from the state, to prove that the person they are persecuting is a criminal and not an innocent person. Once this red notice is issued, it is also important to be able to challenge it. This can be achieved with a better system like the Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files. This commission should have enough power to challenge these cases and be able to delete them if there is not enough proof to support the state’s government. This is in order to prevent the victims from having their rights violated even more. By having the Interpol and the CCF making sure that innocent people are not in the red notice list, the Interpol will be following its constitution, which is not to be politicized, maintaining neutral and making sure that the basic rights of people is protected as established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

OSCE: Too Many Parts Bogging Down This Peace-Making Machine

By Thomas Ashe and Shahriar Chowdhury

Since its inception in 1975, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is an important component for supporting peace and stability in the region. Its mandates include safeguarding and promoting human rights, arms control, including disarmament and confidence- and security-building, and countering terrorism, among many others. This vast portfolio, combined with the ever-increasing need for security, certainly keeps the OSCE busy. However, the decision-making process within the body serves as its barrier to achieve success. One of the defining features of the OSCE is its ability to promote a transparent atmosphere among its members by including each member in their decision-making process. While the convoluted system tries its best to provide an inclusive system for its members, there is evidence demonstrating the need for systemic reform. It is our recommendation that institutions within the OSCE be merged into a new body, named The Permanent Council for Security and Cooperation or (PCSC), and voting be changed to majority in the Parliamentary Assembly and some member states within the PSCS be granted veto power authority.

The current decision-making body is comprised of eight bodies, each serving a specific function. Though these bodies are not directly making policy decisions, they serve in another capacity, as a forum for state representatives to gather and speak on their security interests in the hopes of contributing to collective security while pursuing their own state interest. Already we see a problem with this system, the widespread of interests among its member states diverges from the organizations interests forcing the organization to channel into its subsidiary channels to find some form of consensus. To reach a consensus, the proposal must some way align with member state interests. The current process stagnates at this point because of research and analysis by each decision body. As Valerie Pacer notes in her book, the consensus principle has often led to ambiguous decisions with nonspecific wording. Once a draft resolution is agreed upon, the substantive decisions are made by committees to look over the draft before being passed on to preparatory committees. Proposed resolutions offered to ambassadors are reviewed by each respective party and then when the states re-adjourn for their subsequent meeting, they discuss the recommendation openly among each other. The archaic system is no longer efficient as its process is too rigid to adapt to emerging security trends. At this point, it would be better off to consult with specialized international organizations to address state concerns. Additionally, it would serve OSCE well if it focused on the issues that it can make tangible progress on, and leave other issues, such as those that pertain to the environment, for example, to the United Nations Environment Programme. Reform at the OSCE can be observed as the streamlining of institutions to produce efficiencies, which includes its decision-making process.

Since the OSCE operates under a decision by consensus system we suggest the improvements to be made to the current system is by merging the internal bodies into one new body. As outlined by the OSCE, The Ministerial Council serves as the central-decision making body, the Permanent Council governs day-today operational work, and the Forum for Security Co-operation helps implement security-building measures, and the Parliamentary Assembly serves as the legislative body, facilitating inter-parliamentary dialogue. Rather than having countless internal bodies wielding decision making powers, it would be prudent for the OSCE to eradicate duplications and build a centralized system. The Forum for Security Co-operation would still serve as an important body for security dialogue, while increasing its portfolio to not only security bases issues. We offer a solution: merging the Ministerial Council and Permanent Council into a new body, called The Permanent Council for Security and Cooperation or (PCSC). We believe this strategy can increase effectiveness. Membership within the PSCS will include:

• United States,
• France,
• United Kingdom,
• Germany,
• Sweden,
• Turkey, and
• Russia.

On a rotating basis, from one of each region, a country will be elected as a non-elected member to serve a two-year term. The P-7 members will be granted veto authority. This will ensure that P-7 members will remain at the negotiation table. To achieve this, a member state will introduce a resolution in the Parliamentary Assembly, since this body is tasked with the development of OSCE institutional structures.

The current decision making process limits the organizations ability to act quickly, which undermines organizational efficiency. Reforming the organizational structure essentially cuts to the core of problem. With the OSCE budget of just over 150 million USD, every dollar counts and needs to be spent economically. While consensus voting be a way to ensure agreement with all parties, it can lead to deadlock, which it did in Georgia. Thus, merging institutions and shifting voting procedure to consensus, with veto authority attached to specific member states, will make the organization more effective.

Is It Time for the ILO to Go Soft?

By Eunice Ifeoluwa Adeleke, Cherish Carrillo and Michael Iannalfo

Since its inception in 1919, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has strived to promote communication between governments, employers, and workers. It accomplishes these goals through conventions, legally binding treaties that may or may not be ratified by member states, and recommendations, non binding guidelines. Unfortunately, there are still aspects of the ILO that could be improved. Specifically, the monitoring and enforcement of the conventions and recommendations could be altered so that the ILO can have a stronghold in the compliance from its member states. Monitoring and enforcing the conventions and recommendations are the ILO’s barrier to effectiveness. In order for  the ILO to become more effective, it is our recommendation that it move from hard law to soft law by switching from a rights based approach to a principle based approach and rely on other states to help enforce past conventions and recommendations.  

Soft law will allow for member states to customize ILO labour standards so that they would not threaten to leave. While conventions are technically voluntary, they are formed through detailed negotiations making them easier for states to agree on. In the same manner, recommendations are not intended to be mandatory but act as simple guidelines for national and international policy. In many cases, conventions are supported by recommendations in order to clarify articles within conventions or provide further guidelines to follow. The ILO has difficulty monitoring the implementation of these conventions and recommendations. To alleviate this problem the organization should focus more on implementing nonbinding soft law conventions than binding hard law conventions. Since conventions are legally binding once ratified, they have the effect of being hard law despite the fact that they completely voluntary for states to ratify them. The binding power that conventions have on states makes it less likely that states will ratify them or fully implement them. This is especially true if a state believes that one of these conventions or recommendations threatens its sovereignty. Therefore, the problem has caused the number of conventions that have been ratified to decrease drastically over time.

Moving from hard law to soft law will allow for states to have a greater influence on monitoring practices and help to enforce the ILO mandates that were previously difficult for the ILO to enforce.  One way the ILO could implement more soft law is by switching its governance from rights, which are found within ILO conventions and recommendations and lead to obligations, to that of principles, which are followed by virtue of being ILO members. Thus, principles are more soft law and rights are more hard law. Overall, this strategy would alleviate the threat of states withdrawing and give the ILO strength. Another way this can be accomplished, is by having states enforcing the ILO mandates while the ILO uses soft law mechanisms and softens the conventions to ensure states will sign on to them. Allowing states to enforce mandates, as well as name and shame non-compliant states allows the ILO  to continue to work with a particular country while states are enforcing sanctions. It would also increase the likelihood that states will follow labor standards set by the ILO because they will fear tangible sanctions by other states. The ILO itself has no way of enforcing sanctions, states do.

When countries can implement the conventions and recommendations as they see fit it makes it easier for poorer countries to implement ILO mandates. The ability to implement ILO standards in unique ways, while still abiding by them allows for both labor to be protected, and the interests of the state to be maintained. In this way, the ILO transforms from an organization with no enforcement mechanism for states that ratify conventions but do not follow them, to one that is assisted by states. These strategies would serve two purposes. They would make ILO conventions and recommendations more attractive for states, and, by moving toward soft law, they would allow those ILO policies to be enforced easier.

Moving forward, the ILO must be cautious. Therefore in order to ensure compliance of soft law, it is has to be implemented with the proper incentive. The first step is to focus more on implementing nonbinding soft law conventions than binding hard law conventions. Soft law conventions give room for non-state actors to sign the instrument and engage in compliance mechanisms, which might encourage state actors to comply. The second step is for the ILO to allow states to have a greater influence on monitoring practices and help to enforce ILO mandates that the ILO has difficulty enforcing itself. Thus, to solve the ILO’s barrier to effectiveness it should move to soft law.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: A Refugee Crisis Requires Refugee Funds

By Patricia Mace and Vera Dimoplon

NOTE: For the published version of this op-ed, please click here.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is currently facing the largest refugee crisis since its creation. UNHCR, which was created in reaction to the overwhelming amount of refugees after WWII, has seen its mandate expand while its resources have not. With the overwhelming number of refugees, and more expected after Trump’s decision to enter Syria, UNHCR needs to be equipped to deal with the expected increased number of refugees. A funding reform that gives UNHCR the autonomy and ability to effectively deal with crisis situations could not come at a better moment. An effective reform should include: (1) creation of a crisis fund, (2) limiting earmarking ability by donors, and (3) a no refund policy on donated funds.

When the UNHCR was created in 1950, it was supposed to provide international protection to refugees and find sustainable solutions to their settlement. Global instability and international crises have not only increased the number of refugees significantly, but has forced the expansion of the UNHCR mandate as well.

Historically, UNHCR has had issues due to the fact that its budget is almost entirely dependent on voluntary contributions. The United Nations (UN) provides only 2% of UNHCR’s budget to cover administrative costs. The other 98% of UNHCR’s annual budget, which exceeds $1 billion, comes from donor states. The 98% has to be raised annually through the Global Appeal. To become more effective, UNHCR needs a funding scheme that gives UNHCR the necessary leeway to deal with crisis situations without worrying about funding stipulations. It is our recommendation that UNHCR make significant changes to its funding scheme.

1.Creation of a Crisis Fund – Crisis Situations Require Crisis Funds. Due to the very nature of the situations that UNHCR deals with, it makes sense to establish a fund, which will be utilized specifically in response crisis or the new developments of an existing crisis. With 80% of the funds earmarked for specific programs or causes, UNHCR lacks the autonomy to actually deal with crises or new situations as they arise. While donor states should be allowed to contribute funding where they like, 25% of any donated amount will go to the crisis fund.

2.Dictating the Terms – Donor States and Donor Interests. As previously stated, 80% of UNHCR’s voluntary contributions is earmarked for specific causes, programs, or states. Donors are often able to pursue their own agenda and use their financial contributions to flex their own political muscle. This has challenged UNHCR’s legitimacy since it must stay on good terms with the donor states in order to maintain funding for the following year. It is also wasteful because when funds are earmarked below the program and country level it costs more to manage the contribution than the contribution itself.

3.Donated Money is Donated Money – No Take Backs. Donors have been allowed to recall their donations when their contributions are not utilized by UNHCR. This creates more work for UNHCR and goes against the very nature of the cause they are setup to deal with. The UNHCR is mandated to provide assistance to refugees therefore, any funds that it receives should be distributed amongst the projects that support refugees regardless of preferences or an arbitrary timeline set by the donor.

The implementation of these solutions should be done at the annual Global Appeal which is introduced in December. In the Global Appeal, the UNHCR could specify that a crisis fund will serve as an emergency response fund to address those refugee needs that were not accounted for due to unforeseen circumstances.

With the global refugee crisis growing by the day, UNHCR finds itself in a precarious position. However, António Guterres, former UNHCR Commissioner and presently, the United Nations Secretary-General can help revitalize the Refugee Agency. António Guterres is often described as a refugee champion who worked tirelessly to advocate for the needs of the refugees. His new position as a UN Secretary-General, combined with the experience he has working with refugees, gives him the advantage of being able to identify priorities within the refugee crisis and guide the UNHCR to address them adequately.

UNHCR similar to other international organizations has adapted to deal with the changes in the international community. UNHCR has changed its mandate and scope in order to more effectively deal with the change in refugee needs. The funding issue has been an unfortunate, and unavoidable issue for UNHCR to face. By reforming the current system, UNHCR can gain the autonomy and stability it needs to deal with the present refugee crisis.